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2 Understanding the ASEAN 
Development Gap 
Mark McGillivray, Simon Feeny and 
Sasi Iamsiraroj 
Introduction 
In the minds of ASEAN stakeholders, the ASEAN development gap is the 
disparity that exists between the ASEAN-6 and CLMV groups-that is 
between the original members of ASEAN (Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, 
Philippines and Thailand, plus Brunei Darussalam} and the latter joining 
members (Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar and Viet Nam). The narrowing 
of this gap has been a focus of ASEAN since the launch of the Initiative for 
ASEAN Integration (IAI) at the Fourth Informal ASEAN Summit in 2000. 
Narrowing the development gap is a cornerstone of the equitable economic 
development agenda within ASEAN and forms an important part of the 
ASEAN Roadmap. ASEAN recognises that the gap between its member 
countries needs to be narrowed if it is to move forward in a more unified 
manner towards the achievement of an equitable ASEAN community. 
Since the inception of the IAI, there has been much ambiguity over 
precisely how to define and measure the development gap between ASEAN 
countries. A rigorous and quantifiable definition and measurement of the 
development gap between these groups is required so that policies can be 
developed that directly target specific disparities. To some the gap is 
differences in living standards, variously defined, between ASEAN member 
states. To others the gap relates to differences in policies and other drivers 
of these differences. Reconciling these perspectives requires a shared 
definition of the term 'development', and from this shared understanding 
we can then measure and monitor the development gap. 
This chapter provides a definition of the development gap that is 
consistent with current international thinking on the meaning of 
development. In line with the writings of Nobel Prize-winning economist 
Amartya Sen, and widely accepted quality of life or standard of living 
conceptualisations, it treats development as an end or as an outcome in 
which people are provided with the opportunity to exercise their reasoned 
agency. As such it does not define the development gap in terms of the 
many drivers of development in ASEAN member states, but as the quality 
of life outcomes that these drivers generate. 
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After this initial discussion, the chapter then turns to quantifying the 
ASEAN development gap. The previous chapter provided some initial 
observations of this gap, based on differences in incomes per capita among 
ASEAN members. This chapter provides a more thorough investigation, 
looking at gaps from a number of analytical perspectives and using various 
development achievement indicators. Data from UNDP (United Nations 
Development Program) Human Development Reports, including statistics 
on the well-known and well-used Human Development Index (HDI), are 
used to measure these gaps. 
The chapter then turns to its third principal focus-identifying and 
discussing the drivers of development and their influence on the ASEAN 
development gap. This builds on previous analytical work on the 
ASEAN development gap by Brooks et al. (2010) and Menon (2012). The 
drivers of development identified in this chapter are those for which there is 
both robust theoretical and empirical support, as well as those with broad 
acceptance in policy circles. These drivers will differ in importance among 
ASEAN countries. All these drivers are important in all countries, although 
their relative importance to countries at varying stages of development may 
differ. The identified drivers include trade openness, investment in human and 
physical capital, governance and institutions, labour mobility and external 
development finance. Processes through which these drivers contribute to 
development and to development gaps are identified. 
Defining Development 
'Development' is a term that has many different meanings. It means 
different things to different people. To the layperson, development is often 
seen as the provision of physical infrastructure, such as roads and 
buildings. This is not unlike early notions of development held by policy 
makers and theorists, who saw development as a process whereby 
economies were modernised, progressing from a reliance on agricultural 
output to the industrial sector. In this conception, economic growth was 
largely unquestioned as the main indicator of development. An economy 
was thought to be experiencing development if it was sustaining economic 
growth and to be 'developed' if it achieved a high level of income per capita. 
In this view development was good, and something for all countries to 
aspire to. This was the popular view of development from the 1950s to the 
early to mid-1970s. Others, however, had a much different perspective of 
development. They saw it as inherently negative, involving the exploitation 
of vulnerable groups of people, especially those with relatively low incomes. 
Within this conception, development was characterised by cultural 
degradation, social dislocation and growing inequality. 
While some still see development as a process principally involving 
progress and economic modernisation, most see it in a more nuanced 
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manner. Development, broadly speaking, is seen as multidimensional, 
involving achievements in universally valued quality of life outcomes. The 
UNDP, through its annually published Human Development Reports, has 
provided informed articulations of the notion of development consistent 
with this definition. It has also been arguably the most influential 
proponent of what might be termed a people-centred approach to 
development. The first Human Development Report was published by the 
UNDP in 1990 (UNDP, 1990). In this report the UNDP attempted to shift 
development thinking and strategies away from what was thought to be an 
excessive preoccupation with economic growth, and back to what it saw as 
core values-the UNDP advanced its concept of human development. The 
UNDP defined human development as follows: 
Human development is a process of enlarging people's choices. The 
most critical ones are to lead a long and healthy life, to be educated 
and to enjoy a decent standard of living. If these essential choices are 
not available, many other opportunities remain inaccessible (UNDP, 
1990: 10). 
The UNDP was at pains to emphasise that its concept of development was 
broader than the achievement of economic growth and higher per capita 
incomes or what might be termed 'economic development'. It made the 
powerful point that income is not an end in its own right but a means to an 
end. What matters, according to the UNDP, is not so much the level of 
income but the uses to which it is put. The UNDP invoked the thinking of 
the ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle in articulating this position. 
Aristotle warned against judging societies by achievements in income and 
wealth that are sought not for themselves but desired as means to other 
objectives. More precisely, equating wealth with accumulated income, 
Aristotle's view was that 'wealth is evidently not the good we are seeking, 
for it is merely useful for the sake of something else' (UNDP, 1990, p. 9). 
The UNDP's approach to development has strong conceptual 
underpinnings, being linked to the work of Amartya Sen. Sen was the 
winner of the 1998 Nobel Prize in Economics for his contributions to the 
field of welfare economics. In the late 1970s, Sen began proposing what 
became known as the 'capability approach'. This was in the context of how 
inequality should be judged, with Sen arguing the case for looking at 
inequalities not in variables such as income but in what he referred to as 
basic capabilities (Sen, 1980). Sen had long been critical of the use of 
income as a measure of development, because in his view the level of 
income or its growth was not as important as what it could be used to 
purchase (Sen, 1985). To this extent he is in agreement with Aristotle. 
Accordingly, as Alkii;e (2002) points out, development in Sen's capability 
approach is not defined as an increase in income growth, or for that matter 
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in terms of enhanced education or health alone, but as an expansion of 
capability. Capability is treated as the freedom to promote or achieve 
combinations of valuable functionings (Sen, 1990). Functionings, in turn, 
are the 'parts of the state of person - in particular the things that he or she 
manages to do or be in leading a life' (Sen, 1993: 31). The link between 
freedom and development was a theme Sen articulated further in 
subsequent writings. In his well-known work, Development as Freedom 
(Sen, 1999), he argued that the expansion of freedom is both a primary end 
and a principal means of development. More precisely, he argued that 
development involved the removal of the 'unfreedoms that leave people 
with little choice and little opportunity of exercising their reasoned agency' 
(Sen, 1999: xii). It is reference to this choice, and the view that basic 
capabilities include the ability to lead a long and healthy life, the ability to 
be knowledgeable, and the ability to have access to the resources associated 
with a decent standard of living that links the UNDP's approach to the 
work of Sen (UNDP, 1995: 18). 
The UNDP not only proposed its own definition of human development 
but also a measure designed to show which countries had achieved the 
highest levels of this development and which had achieved the lowest. This 
measure is the now famous HDI. The HDI provides a league table-a 
ranking-of countries based on the levels of human development they have 
each achieved. A detailed technical description of the HDI is not necessary 
for our current purposes, and will be provided later in Chapter Three, but 
it combines measures of achievement in three dimensions-longevity, 
knowledge and the material standard of living-into a single number. The 
HDI has changed since its inception in 1990 but in the original version 
these measures were life expectancy, adult literacy and a measure of GDP 
(Gross Domestic Product) per capita adjusted for differences in the cost of 
living between countries (UNDP, 1990). The use of a measure of income in 
the HDI has in some circles been contentious, seemingly being inconsistent 
with the UNDP's invoking of Aristotle's thinking regarding wealth. By way 
of justification, income provides security against unforeseen circumstances 
and can serve as a proxy for many other quality of life achievements not 
directly captured by indicators of health and education. Irrespective of 
what we might think of such justifications, along with GNI (Gross 
National Income) and GDP per capita, the HDI is now arguably the most 
widely used and reported measure of the level of development among 
countries. 
High levels of inequality and poverty have long been associated with 
low levels of development. Reductions in inequality and poverty and their 
links to development were identified in an extremely influential work 
published initially in late 1969 by Dudley Seers. This writing, and the 
thinking on which it is based, still has considerable influence today. Seers 
rejected the view that development was an objective or positive concept 
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that, for example, described what was necessary for a country to achieve 
higher living standards for its citizens. Instead, he thought that 
development should be seen as a concept that requires us to identify the 
normative conditions for a universally acceptable aim, which for Seers 
was the 'realization of the potential of human personality' (Seers 1972: 
6). While this realisation is different to Sen's notion of development, it is 
similar in that like exercising reasoned agency, it can be seen as a 
universally accepted aim. 
Seers argued that three questions had to be addressed in considering 
whether realisation, as he defined it, was being achieved. They were: (1) 
what has been happening to income poverty?; (2) what has been happening 
to unemployment?; and (3) what is happening to income inequality? Seers 
asserted that if all three of these phenomena had declined over time from 
high levels, then 'beyond doubt this has been a period of development for 
the country concerned' (Seers, 1969: 3). He further asserted that 'if one or 
two of these central problems have been growing worse, especially if all 
three have, it would be strange to call the result "development" even if per 
capita income doubled' (Seers, 1972: 7). On the issue of inequality, Seers 
argued that poverty could be reduced much more quickly if economic 
growth was accompanied by reduced inequality. The same by inference 
applies to unemployment. One can further infer that of the three questions 
posed by Seers, the first, concerning poverty, was the most important. This 
is not to imply that he considered inequality and unemployment to matter 
only in terms of their implications for poverty reduction. To the contrary, 
Seers viewed equity as an objective in its own right, arguing that inequity 
was objectionable on ethical grounds. It is simply to imply that what 
mattered most was poverty reduction. On these grounds, but also in part 
due to data availability, we later focus our attention on poverty reduction. 
Seers' position should not be interpreted as a rejection of per capita 
income as a measure of development, or as the assertion that the 
achievement of high income levels is not in itself development. Instead it 
should be interpreted as an argument for not only looking at this measure 
in assessing development achievements. Nor should Seers' position be seen 
as inconsistent with the notion of human development as outlined above. 
Seers was concerned with income poverty. This poverty occurs when 
incomes fall below a threshold, or a poverty line. A widely used poverty 
line is 1.25 purchasing power parity dollars per day. The UN Millennium 
Development Goal of halving world poverty is based on this line. 
Achievement in income is a dimension of human development. A country 
containing large numbers of people living in income poverty will have 
lower levels of income per capita and as a consequence lower levels of 
human development than would otherwise be the case. 
Looking at poverty and inequality or disparity does not confine attention 
to income achievements only: both can be looked at from a 
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multidimensional development achievement perspective. When Seers made 
his contributions to development thinking poverty and inequality were 
considered from an income perspective. Much more recent thinking looks 
at poverty and inequality from a multidimensional perspective. 
Multidimensional poverty has been the subject of much attention. Poverty 
is broadly defined as the lack of something of special importance (Gasper, 
2007). From a multidimensional development perspective, this clearly 
includes, but is not limited to, income. The World Bank, for example, 
acknowledges that: 
[a]lthough poverty has been traditionally measured in monetary terms, 
it has many other dimensions. Poverty is not only associated with 
insufficient money or consumption but also with insufficient outcomes 
with respect to health, nutrition, and literacy (Coudouel et al., 2002). 
The concept of multidimensional poverty not only recognises that there is 
more to being in poverty than having a low income, but also that absence of 
income poverty does not guarantee the absence of other forms of poverty. 
Put differently, a person or country can be non-poor in terms of income but 
poor in terms of another development dimension. Improvements in income 
will not guarantee improvements in these dimensions and vice versa. 
The ASEAN Development Gap: Definition 
Defining development in terms of achievements in or levels of health, 
education and income has clear implications for how development gaps are 
defined and measured. As these achievements differ among individuals 
according to the country in which they live, development in this sense 
varies among countries. This variation may be considered as a development 
gap, and this is how the gap between the ASEAN-6 and CLMV countries 
will now be examined. The means by which development is achieved are, 
of course, all those factors that drive achievements in health, education, 
income and other valued quality of life achievements. It follows that these 
factors are also the drivers of development gaps. To be clear, for the 
purpose of this chapter and those that follow, the achievements in, or levels 
of, these drivers of development is not considered development per se; 
development is the intrinsically valued quality of life outcomes that these 
drivers generate. 
If the gap is defined in terms of the many drivers of development this 
would lead to a very long list of variables that would need to be quantified 
and monitored. This list is likely to be very long, and the requisite data 
required for quantification and monitoring will not be available for many 
of these indicators. Nor is it likely that widespread agreement within 
ASEAN or elsewhere could be achieved regarding the variables that belong 
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on this list. Even if all requisite data are available, and agreement on the list 
could be obtained, monitoring would be a very difficult and time-
consuming exercise and the interpretation of the monitoring results very 
difficult. In contrast, data on achievements in health, education and income 
are widely available for ASEAN countries. 
But lefs assume that agreement on a list of drivers of the development 
gap could be obtained, and that data on each of these variables were 
available for all ASEAN countries. Further, let's assume that the various 
imperatives identified in the three ASEAN Blueprints, referred to in 
Chapter One, can be quantified for all of these countries. While these 
quantifications can and probably should be used for monitoring the 
implementation of the Blueprints, this in itself does not provide a 
sufficiently strong case both to define the development gap and monitor 
this gap over time along these lines. 
The AEC Blueprint has among its priorities the free flow of goods, 
services, skilled labour and investment and fairer competition among firms. 
To highlight our case let us assume that progress is being made against these 
priorities in all ASEAN countries, those in the CLMV group in particular. 
This progress in itself is of little value in its own right. We need to ask what 
the purpose of a freer flow of goods or increased competition is, and why 
they are of value. They are only of value if they lead to outcomes that are of 
intrinsic value, such as progress in quality of life dimensions. Here we need 
to refer back to Aristotle's position on wealth, that it is only useful for the 
sake of something else. This applies to most of the drivers of development 
outlined in this book, and also to the Blueprint priorities. We also need to 
ask why the Blueprints were adopted by ASEAN. This was due to a concern 
for differences in living standards among member states. 
Of course, it could be argued that achievement in drivers that can be 
leveraged by policies outlined in the Blueprints ensures achievement in 
intrinsic quality of life outcomes, so that in monitoring the former we are, 
in effect, monitoring the latter. This argument is flawed as it ignores the 
fact that there are many other drivers that cannot themselves be driven by 
policy. Policies might well be implemented successfully, with increased 
competition, freer flows of goods, increased infrastructure investment and 
so on. It could also be the case that levels of infrastructure investment and 
the flow of goods and services between each ASEAN member is equalised. 
But clearly this will not ensure that living standards between ASEAN 
members are equalised. It does not even guarantee improvements in the 
quality of life and it could be very misleading to simply assume that it has 
increased in line with success in terms of policies aimed at driving the 
drivers. Given the above remarks, it follows that the case for monitoring 
development gaps in what might be termed high-level achievements in 
health, education and income is not confined to definitional convenience 
and data availability. 
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The ASEAN Development Gap: Measurement 
Multidimensional Development Achievements 
ASEAN HDI and income per capita data are shown in Figures 2.1and2.2 
respectively. The data required to construct these figures, as well as Figures 
2.3 to 2.6 and Table 2.1, were taken from UNDP (2012).1 The data in 
UNDP (2012) are widely used in policy and research circles and are highly 
accessible, being available for download from the UNDP website. In some 
instances missing yearly values for some countries had to be estimated, 
typically by linear extrapolation. Income per capita, infant mortality and 
adult literacy data for 2011 were not available for any countries. Each 
country value indicator was obtained by extrapolation using a linear time 
trend for the years in question, namely 2000 to 2011. The measure of 
income per capita shown in Table 2.1 is GNI per capita recorded in 
purchasing power parity dollars. GNI is preferred over the other common 
measure of per capita income-GDP per capita-as it includes income 
from abroad whereas the latter does not. Purchasing power parity data are 
preferred as they are adjusted to reflect differences in the costs of living 
between countries, which is important from a quality of life perspective. 
Large differences in average development achievements between the 
ASEAN-6 and CLMV are evident from Figures 2.1 and 2.2. Therefore 
concerns about the ASEAN development gap within official circles have 
empirical support. 
There are many ways the development gap can be quantified using the 
HDI and GNI per capita and, of course, other development achievement 
measures. Different quantifications will be discussed and provided in 
Chapter Three. For the moment we confine ourselves to a simple but 
empirically and conceptually valid measure, that is the difference between 
average ASEAN-6 and average CLMV achievement, with the latter average 
being subtracted from the former. 
A major consideration in selecting this measure is whether to use 
weighted ASEAN-6 and CLMV averages that take account of each ASEAN 
member's population size. It is common, although not universally accepted 
in research on inter-country income inequality to weight measures using 
each country's share of world population (see, for example, Milanovic, 
2005, Firebaugh, 1999, McGillivray, 2010, and McGillivray and Markova, 
2010). The basic rationale behind this is that countries with higher 
populations should have a greater impact on what is being measured. In the 
case of ASEAN development gaps, it would be expected to attach a higher 
weighting to the ASEAN-6 countries given the very large populations of 
Indonesia and the Philippines. This would mean that the gap, if population 
weights were applied, would be greater than would otherwise be the case. 
In the final analysis it was decided not to apply population weights. This 
is on the grounds that within ASEAN policy and political circles the 
Understanding the ASEAN Development Gap 29 
concern is for gaps in development achievements between countries 
irrespective of their population sizes. In other words, there would still be 
concerns within ASEAN for the lagging development achievements of the 
CLMV countries, even if their populations were much smaller than they 
actually are. 
Gaps in unweighted averages are shown in Figures 2.3 and 2.4. These 
averages have been calculated using data for all ASEAN member countries. 
In terms of human development and income per capita achievements, this 
gap is the vertical distance between the graph lines in Figures 2.1 and 2.2. 
These figures show gaps commencing in 2000, after all CLMV countries 
had joined ASEAN, until the latest year (2011) that data are currently 
available for all countries. Particularly interesting are the trends over time 
in the gaps in question. For example, the gap in human development has 
fallen by 13 per cent between 2000 and 2011; while during the same period 
the gap in income per capita has increased by 10 per cent. That the income 
gap has not reduced is consistent with the findings of the econometric 
investigation of Alavi and Ramadan (2008 ). 
While it is a positive sign that the development gap between the 
ASEAN-6 and CLMV is converging over time, the rate of convergence and 
the relative distance between the two groups remains significant. The gap 
between these groups is emphasised by the information in Table 2.1. This 
table reports the number of years, based on simple linear time trends over 
the period 2000-2011, each country will take to converge with the highest 
individual ASEAN country achievement in 2011 with respect to each of the 
development gap indicators in question. The method used to calculate this 
number of years is outlined in Appendix 2.1. It follows that a gap also 
exists in these indicators, with the CLMV countries lagging well 
0.80 --.------ ----··-·---· ·--· ··---·----- -·--·· -----·----- - -··-··-· - --· --·--·--·-···-·---··-· --·--·-- -----·- .. 
' g 0.70 -l-- ---· - --·--·· --- --------- --------------- --
6 
c 
~ 
0. .. 
0 0.40 ··'·---------------···--· ---··- -----·--------· -- ----· ----·- -------------- - --------- -- ------- --·--·--~ 
OQ) 0.30 -~ ··- .. -····- - ·- ·-·. -· - ··-·-· ·---- - ··-----· --····-- -- -- -··--····· .. - ------ --- ··- --- ---·····-
' ~ 0.20 -t-- --·--··-- ·---·- ·· ··· ··--- -- ----- ... -··------·· 
::i 
I 0.10 -j--- -- - -- - - -- -- -------- --- - ·-- ------- ----------·-·-··-------···-------- -------
! 
Q .OQ ...!.--·---,-·----,---~ ------,---··------- ···~-----·, · -- ;-- -----c-- --T-·····-·, ----··, ··- -----.-----·, 
~i::::, ~<o PJi::::, g,<o s::::ii::::, s::::i' s:::,'1- s:::,":> ~ s:::,<o s:::,<o s:::,"\ s:::,ro s:::,OJ ,__i::::, "' ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 
- ASEAN-6 Average CLMV Average 
Figure 2.1 Differences in human development between ASEAN countries, 
1980-2011 (Data source: UNDP, 2012) 
30 Mark McGillivray, Simon Feeny and Sasi Iamsiraroj 
z 
0 - ASEAN-6 Average , · CLMV Average 
Figure 2.2 Differences in achievements in income between ASEAN countries, 
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Figure 2.3 Human development gap between CLMV and ASEAN-6 countries, 
2000-2011 (Data source: UNDP, 2012) 
behind their ASEAN-6 counterparts. These are the number of years to 
eliminate the ASEAN development gap measured using various indicators. 
It also reports the number of years required for each country to converge 
with the ASEAN-6 average for each indicator, with the exception of those 
countries that have already achieved these averages. These variables include 
achievements in health (indicated by life expectancy in years and the infant 
mortality rate), education (indicated by mean years of schooling and 
expected years of schooling), income (indicated by $PPP purchasing power 
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Figure 2.4 Income gap between CLMV and ASEAN-6 countries, 2000-2011 
(Data source: UNDP, 2012) 
parity) and multidimensional development (indicated by the HDI). These 
variables are widely used in international development policy making and 
research circles and include those used in the current HDI (UNDP, 2011). 
The information in Table 2.1 is sobering. Based on the results of the 
simple calculations reported, it will take the CLMV countries between 25 
and 27 years to achieve the highest individual ASEAN country HDI score 
in 2011 based on trends in this variable since 2000. It will take them 
between 15 and 19 years to reach the 2011 average ASEAN-6 HDI score. 
For achievement in income, the equivalent numbers are between 37 and 59 
years and 28 and 44 years. The estimated number of years for convergence 
to occur in the other indicators is typically higher, in some cases 
considerably so. For example, at the upper end of the scale, it is estimated 
that Viet Nam will take 268 years to achieve the highest individual ASEAN 
country achievement in expected years of schooling, and that Cambodia 
will take 235 to do likewise with respect to mean years of schooling. 
What is also revealing from Table 2.1 is that the ASEAN-6 countries 
Indonesia and the Philippines will also take many years to achieve the 
benchmarks on which the calculations are based. In some cases they will 
take longer than some CLMV countries. The Philippines will take longer to 
achieve the 2011 average ASEAN-6 achievement in life expectancy than all 
the CLMV countries, and Indonesia will take longer to achieve the 
corresponding average for infant mortality than all of these countries except 
Myanmar. While this is based on estimates, it is nonetheless of policy 
relevance. It also points to a danger of measuring gaps using averages, which 
can conceal important information. We return to this issue in Chapter Three. 
Table 2.1 Estimated years required for elimination of ASEAN development gap based on recent trends 
Achievement in Health Achievement in Education Achievement Achievement in 
in Income Human Development 
Life Infant Mean Years Expected Years Adult GNI Per Human 
Expectancy Mortality of Schooling of Schooling Literacy Capita $PPP Development Index 
Years Required for Convergence with Highest ASEAN Achievement 
ASEAN-6 
Brunei 19 46 n/a n/a 
Darussalam 
Indonesia 32 76 15 5 3 60 20 
Malaysia 35 21 n/a 18 7 38 16 
Philippines 66 88 6 so 17 78 46 
Singapore n/a n/a <1 n/a 3 n/a n/a 
Thailand 46 56 19 85 <1 13 20 
CLMV 
Cambodia 29 49 235 11 17 59 25 
LaoPDR 21 69 47 21 35 58 27 
Myanmar 48 139 35 21 16 37 26 
Viet Nam 32 57 28 268 22 50 27 
Achievement in Health Achievement in Education Achievement Achievement in 
in Income Human Development 
Life Infant Mean Years Expected Years Adult GNI Per Human 
Expectancy Mortality of Schooling of Schooling Literacy Capita $PPP Development Index 
Years Required Convergence with Average ASEAN-6 Achievement 
ASEAN-6 
Brunei n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Darussalam 
Indonesia 14 23 10 n/a .1. 40 10 
Malaysia <1 n/a n/a 5 5 13 n/a 
Philippines 31 88 n/a 26 8 52 21 
Singapore n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Thailand 1 n/a 10 36 n/a 7 6 
CLMV 
Cambodia 19 28 155 I 15 44 17 
LaoPDR 11 47 36 15 27 43 18 
Myanmar 29 78 28 15 11 28 19 
Viet Nam n/a 23 19 187 15 35 15 
Data source: UNDP (2012) 
Note: n/a: not applicable, as country is that with the highest or has equal to or greater than average ASEAN-6 achievement. 
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It should be emphasised that the calculations underlying Table 2.1 
are relatively simple. They obviously take no account of growth in the 
highest development achievement of those countries in 2011, holding 
this achievement constant in all calculations. Nor do they take into 
account that continual achievements occur non-linearly over time, with 
it becoming increasing difficult to sustain rates of achievement at 
higher and higher levels. Both of these factors point to the estimated 
years required for the elimination of a development gap based on recent 
progress alone to be under-estimates. This points to the enormity of 
the task of eliminating, or at least significantly reducing, development 
gaps among ASEAN member countries, and the significant policy 
challenges ahead. 
A different perspective on the ASEAN development gap is provided 
in Figures 2.5 and 2.6. They provide information on disparities among 
all countries, not just between the ASEAN-6 and CLMV groups. 
Disparity, or inequality, is measured using a Theil Entropy measure, 
which is used widely in research on inequality. This measure is outlined 
in Appendix 2.2. The higher the level of this measure the greater the 
inequality and vice versa. Disparities in human development and 
income achievements among the ASEAN-6 group since the mid-1980s 
and for the full ASEAN membership since the early 2000s are included 
in these figures. What is clear is that the addition of the CLMV group 
has made ASEAN a much more diverse group, contributing to a higher 
overall level of disparity. This is evident from the sharp jumps in the 
Theil measure from mid- to late 1990s; note that Viet Nam joined 
ASEAN in 1995. 
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Figure 2.6 Disparity in income per capita among ASEAN countries, 1980-2011 
Poverty Reduction Achievements 
It is unambiguous that a development gap between the ASEAN-6 and 
CLMV countries exists, with the latter lagging behind the former in 
achievements in human development and income. This is not the case if the 
existence of a gap is defined in terms of poverty levels. Figures 2.7 to 2.10 
indicate why. Constructed using data obtained from World Bank (2012), 
these figures contain information on poverty levels in ASEAN-6 and 
CLMV countries. They are based on the two most widely used poverty 
measures, the number of people living below the $PPP1.25 per day poverty 
line and the number living below the $PPP2.00 per day poverty line. These 
measures are also known as poverty headcounts, as they are obtained by 
counting the number of people living below the chosen poverty lines. 
For both measures, there are more people living in income poverty in the 
ASEAN-6 group than the CLMV group. So there is a development gap, 
defined purely in terms of income poverty, but it is subtaintially in the 
CLMV group's favour. As Figure 2.7 suggests, there have been significant 
reductions in $PPP1.25 per day poverty rates in the CLMV countries over 
the last 15 years. Much of this is due to the performance of Viet Nam. The 
rate of reduction in poverty at this level has been less impressive in the 
ASEAN-6 countries and has stabilised relative to the CLMV, as can be 
clearly seen in Figure 2.8. 
Based on the most recent comprehensive country-level data at our 
disposal, relating to 2008, just under 66 million people in ASEAN-6 
countries lived on less than $PPP1.25 per day. Almost all of these people 
lived in Indonesia and the Philippines. In the CLMV group, just under 
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Figure 2.7 Number of people living on less than $PPP1.25 per day in ASEAN 
countries, 1981-2008 (Data source: World Bank, 2012) 
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Figure 2.8 Number of people living on less than $PPP2.00 per day in ASEAN 
countries, 1981-2008 (Data source: World Bank, 2012) 
20 million lived on less than $PPP1.25 per day, meaning that there were 
46 million more people living in extreme income poverty in the ASEAN-6 
group than in the CLMV group. Poverty data for Myanmar are not 
available and not, therefore, included in this comparison, nor are data for 
Singapore and Brunei Darussalam owing to unavailability, although this 
is of no consequence for the present analysis owing to there being few 
people living in poverty in these countries. Yet if data for Myanmar were 
available and included in the CLMV total this would not swing the gap in 
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the ASEAN-6 group's favour as the total population of this country was 
47.25 million in 2008 (UNDP, 2012). For the $PPP2.00 per day line, 
there are 120 million more people living under this poverty line in 2008 
or 2009 in the ASEAN-6 group than in the CLMV group. Data for 
Mynmar are also not included in this comparison owing to unavailability 
but it if it was the case that all Mynamar citizens lived on less the 
$PPP2.00 per day, which is certainly not the case, then there would still 
be an excess 70 million more people living in poverty according to this 
line in ASEAN-6 than CLMV countries. 
In examining poverty levels one needs not only to look at the number 
of people living in poverty but also at how far the incomes of the poor fall 
below the poverty line in question. Put differently, one needs to look at 
both the extent and depth of poverty. The depth of poverty is measured 
by the poverty gap indicator, which shows the average income shortfall 
from the poverty line of the population living below it. Poverty gap data 
based on the $PPP1.25 and $PPP2.00 poverty lines are shown in Figures 
2.9 and 2 .10 respectively. These data are also taken from World Bank 
(2012). In each of these figures the average gaps for the ASEAN-6 and 
CLMV countries are plotted for those countries for which poverty gap 
data are available. The countries for which data are not available are 
Myanmar, Singapore and Brunei Darussalam. What the figures reveal is 
that while there are more poor people in the ASEAN-6 than CLMV 
countries, the poor in the latter are poorer than those in the former. In 
2008 the extremely poor in the CLMV countries fell on average below 
the $PPP1.25 poverty line by roughly twice their counterparts in the 
ASEAN-6 countries, by 4.9 per cent compared to 2.2 per cent. 
Approximately the same margin applies to the $PPP2.00 poverty line, 
being 18.6 per cent for the CLMV countries and 8.30 per cent for the 
ASEAN-6. This does not imply that the poor in the CLMV countries are 
on average twice as poor as those in ASEAN-6 countries, just that they 
are poorer. In 2008 those below the $PPP1.25 poverty line in CLMV 
countries were on average 4 per cent poorer than those in ASEAN-6. For 
the $PPP2.00 line the poorer in the former group of countries were on 
average 11 per cent poorer than those in the former group. 
From the preceding discussion it has been established that there are 
many more poor people in the ASEAN-6 than in the CLMV group, but 
those in the former are less poor than those in the latter. So which group 
has the highest development achievement assessed against an income 
poverty criterion, and in whose favour does the development gap fall? A 
crude way of combining information on the number of people living in 
poverty and the poverty gap is simply to multiply the two indicators by 
each other, or to multiplicatively weight the poverty gap by the poverty 
headcount. Such a weighting is shown in Figures 2.11 and 2.12, for the 
$PPP1.25 and $PPP2.00 poverty lines respectively. It has been calculated 
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Figure 2.9 Income poverty gap at $PPP1.25 per day in ASEAN countries, 1981-
2008 (Data source: World Bank, 2012) 
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Figure 2.10 Income poverty gap at $PPP2.00 per day in ASEAN countries, 1981-
2008 (Data source: World Bank, 2012) 
using the data plotted in Figures 2.7 to 2.10. It is shown that ASEAN-6 
countries on average lag slightly behind the CLMV group in terms of both 
poverty lines. 
Finally, with respect to income poverty, another way of looking at 
poverty is to look at what might be described as its intensity or incidence, 
measured by the percentage of a country's population that lives below the 
chosen poverty line. This is consistent with equating a country's 
development achievement with its success in minimising the proportion of 
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Figure 2 .12 Income poverty gap weighted by headcount at $PPP2.00 per day in 
ASEAN countries, 1981-2008 
its population that live in income poverty. This information on the intensity 
of poverty is shown in Figures 2.13 and 2.14, for the $PPP1.25 and $PPP2.00 
per day poverty lines. The data used to construct these figures has been 
taken from World Bank (2012) and has the same country coverage of Figures 
2.7 to 2.10. The intensity of poverty is higher in the CLMV than ASEAN-6 
group, although the gap has narrowed since the early 1990s. Measured using 
the $PPP1.25 poverty. line, in 2008 it was only slightly higher in the former 
than the latter, being 18.6 per cent compared to 16.7 per cent. 
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2008 (Data source: World Bank, 2012) 
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Figure 2.14 Intensity of poverty at $PPP2.00 per day in ASEAN countries, 1981-
2008 (Data source: World Bank, 2012) 
It was noted above that poverty is multidimensional. Thus far we have 
focused purely on income poverty in assessing the ASEAN development 
gap. The UNDP provides a measure of multidimensional poverty-the 
Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI). The MPI recognises three quality 
of life dimensions that are considered important to all people in all 
societies. These dimensions are health, education and material living 
standards. Household achievements in these dimensions are measured 
using ten equally weighted indicators (Alkire and Santos, 2010; UNDP, 
2010). Further details of the MPI are provided in Chapter Three. 
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The MPI was first introduced in the Human Development Report 2010 
(UNDP, 2010) and at present the country and yearly coverage of the index 
is rather limited. UNDP (2011) provides MPI scores for all ASEAN 
countries except Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia and Singapore. Shown 
below in Figure 2.15 are scores for the 2000s, ranging from 2000 for 
Myanmar to 2008 for the Philippines. Multidimensional poverty is on 
average far higher-three times-in the CLMV than the three ASEAN-6 
countries, Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand (IPT) . The MPI is 
interpreted differently to the income poverty measures discussed above, 
encompassing both the depth of poverty and its intensity. 
The ASEAN Development Gap: A Synthesis 
How might the material presented above be summarised and synthesised? 
What has been shown is that a development gap exists, with the CLMV 
countries lagging behind their ASEAN-6 counterparts in each of the 
development achievements in the health, education and income dimensions, 
based on all indicators considered. However, this gap has narrowed slightly 
over the last decade. The gap in income has increased by 10 per cent during 
this time though. Different messages are provided by the poverty data. 
There appears to be a very large development gap that favours the CLMV 
countries. The gap based on the number of people living below the 
$PPP1.25 and $2.00 per day poverty lines sees the ASEAN-6 countries 
lagging well behind their CLMV counterparts; the reverse is the case based 
on the average poverty gap where the CLMV group lags slightly behind 
ASEAN- 6 in terms of the intensity of poverty. 
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Figure 2.15 Multidimensional poverty in ASEAN countries (Data source: 
UNDP, 2011) 
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What can we conclude from these findings? It follows that if we are to 
talk of an ASEAN development gap that is real and empirically robust 
across a variety of measures, then this applies to multidimensional 
development but not poverty reduction achievements. Or, put differently, 
the gap is only meaningful and evident if we define development in terms of 
the former achievements only. On these grounds, what shall follow in this 
chapter and the remainder of the book is a focus on the ASEAN 
development gap defined on the basis of overall achievements in the 
identified development variables. 
Drivers of the ASEAN Development Gap 
The ASEAN development gap arises from differential development 
achievements. Policy interventions seeking to reduce the gap must be based 
on an understanding of what drives it, and, in turn, which of these drivers 
can themselves be driven by policy interventions. Achievements in health, 
education and income are endogenously related. Growth in incomes is, in 
particular, a major driver of achievements in health and education. It does 
so by providing both public and private resources that can be allocated to 
health and education services (McGillivray, 2005). Growth alone is 
insufficient to guarantee broad-based achievements in health and 
education, but it is necessary for such achievement (Commission on 
Growth and Development, 2008). 
What drives income growth, in large part, drives these achievements. 
This is true in general, but also applicable to the CLMV countries, as 
shown in Figures 2.16 to 2.20. These figures contain scatter plots linking 
achievements in $PPP GNI per capita to adult literacy, infant mortality 
and the HDI respectively. The first of these variables is expressed as a 
natural logarithm, reflecting the well-known diminishing marginal 
returns to the conversion of income to other quality of life dimensions. 
Each scatter plot contains a line of best fit, obtained from a simple 
regression of $PPP GNI per capita on each of the three other achievement 
variables. These scatter plots show the simple statistical relationship 
between the former and the latter variables. These relationships should 
be interpreted as showing a general association as the method obtained to 
depict them ignores a range of statistical issues such as endogeneity (in 
which income both drives and is driven by the other variables) and the 
influence of variables other -than income on the health and education 
outcomes under consideration. They, in particular, do not and are in no 
way intended to show a precise, causal relationship, just a general 
association. This caveat noted, in each case higher achievements in 
income per capita are associated with higher achievements in the other 
four variables. Higher achievements in the case of infant mortality means 
a reduction in the infant mortality rate. 
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Figure 2.16 Association between income per capita and infant mortality, CLMV 
countries, 2000- 2011 (Data source: UNDP, 2011) 
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Figure 2.17 Association between income per capita and adult literacy, CLMV 
countries, 2000-2011 (Data source: UNDP, 2011) 
In what follows we first examine drivers of growth. These drivers include 
health and education. It follows that if we are to understand and devise 
policies aimed at driving growth we also need to know what drives 
achievements in health and education. This topic is also examined below. 
There is an enormous academic and policy literature on these drivers. 
Many drivers are identified but there is significant disagreement over some 
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of them. In what follows we focus on key drivers that are thought to be 
common to all countries that have been shown, or are widely believed to 
have the potential, to be important to ASEAN countries. It follows that if 
certain drivers are to be stimulated in efforts to reduce the ASEAN 
development gap there needs to be confidence that there is a real and robust 
link between each driver and development achievements. An objective of 
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our examination is to provide such confidence, based not only evidence 
from ASEAN, where it exists, but on the experience of other countries as 
documented in the research literature. 
Drivers of Growth 
As Brooks et al. (2010) and Menon (2012) and many other studies note, the 
literature points to the following key drivers of growth: 
1 physical capital; 
2 openness to trade; 
3 human capital; 
4 financial sector development; 
5 governance; 
6 labour mobility; 
7 foreign direct investment, and; 
8 external development finance. 
Of these drivers, it is physical capital that is the least contentious. Physical 
capital or infrastructure includes roads, water supply, power grids, 
telecommunications and water supply and sanitation systems. As Brooks et 
al. (2010: 7) comment, 'no country has sustained economic growth without 
also keeping up an impressive rate of investment in infrastructure'. While 
there is some speculation about the precise empirical contribution of 
infrastructure investment to growth, and discussion of the contributions of 
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different types of infrastructure, it can be taken as a basic fact that ongoing 
investment in infrastructure, together with maintenance of the 
infrastructure stock, are keys to achieving and sustaining higher per capita 
income levels. This is substantiated time and time again in the research 
literature. Brooks et al. (2010) refer to the research of Calderon and Serven 
(2004) in support of the statement quoted above. This cross-country 
research of 100 nations covered the period 1960-2000. It found that an 
increase of one standard deviation of an index in infrastructure stocks 
would raise per capita income by an average of 2.9 percentage points per 
country. It is clear from the preceding comments that ongoing investments 
in infrastructure in CLMV countries are essential for reducing the ASEAN 
development gap. This issue is discussed in some detail in Chapter Four. 
It is important to be clear as to what is meant by openness to trade. 
Trade openness refers to the actual or potential extent an economy trades 
with the rest of the world. As such it may be defined and measured in two 
broad ways. It may be defined as the extent to which an economy trades 
with the rest of the word, measured by the volume of its trade flows relative 
to the size of its domestic economy. The volume of trade relative to GDP is 
measured by the sum of the economy's exports and imports as a share of its 
GDP. Yet an economy may still be open to international trade even if it has 
low trade volumes. Key here is the policy stance of the government of the 
country in question. An economy may be considered open to trade if the 
following conditions are present: if imports are able to flow freely into it 
owing to an absence of tariff and non-tariff barriers; if there is an absence 
of a black market for foreign exchange that sees the exchange rate for the 
country's currency below the official rate; and if there is an absence of 
government monopolies in major exports and a command economic 
system. These specific indicators are the criteria on which the well-known 
Sachs and Warner (1995) measure of policy-related trade openness is based. 
Openness can contribute to growth in per capita incomes in a variety of 
ways. Exporting to the rest of the world can allow for greater capacity 
utilisation and economies of scale and incentives for technological 
innovation and improved management efficiency due to the pressure of 
overseas competition, as Feder (1982), Balassa (1985) and a host of other 
studies have noted. Importing goods from the rest of the world can allow 
for the greater absorption of technological advances and for greater 
productive capacity. Moreover, as Edwards (1997) and others note, if the 
costs of technological imitation in poorer countries are lower than the costs 
of locally developed technological innovations, then these countries can 
grow faster than their richer counterparts and development gaps can be 
reduced more expeditiously. 
There is an enormous empirical literature on the impact of trade 
openness on growth. Among the many studies focusing on developing 
countries are Balassa (1978, 1985), Dollar (1992), Edwards (1993) and 
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Yanikkaya (2003). Any objective and comprehensive reading of this 
literature would conclude that the relationship between trade openness 
and per capita income growth is ambiguous. This is not to imply that 
trade, both import and export, does not contribute to higher growth. To 
the contrary, there is a robust and positive empirical relationship between 
trade volumes relative to GDP being drivers of per capita income growth. 
The ambiguity is over the impact of policy regimes and trade 
liberalisation. While it seems that most economists and policy makers 
strongly favour trade liberalisation, it is not clear that removing 
restrictions on trade is necessarily good for growth in all circumstances. 
Yanikkaya (2003) actually concludes that trade restrictions, including 
those imposed under an import substitution regime, can under certain 
circumstances be beneficial for growth. These circumstances include 
whether production in a protected sector is relatively efficient. This is 
consistent with the position taken by Rodrik (1999) and cited by 
Yanikkaya, that just as the advantages of import substitution policies 
were overstated in earlier eras, the benefits of openness have often been 
oversold by its proponents. Such a finding should not in any way be seen 
as an unqualified justification for trade restriction. Such restriction can 
only be justified, if and only if, it can be shown that the government in 
question selects the right sector to protect. 
There is also a large literature on the impact of openness in ASEAN 
countries, mostly relating to the ASEAN-6 countries. Some studies have 
concluded that exports have played an important role in promoting growth 
(see, for example, Fukuda and Toya, 1995, and Hsiao and Hsiao, 2006). 
Others question the direction of causation, presenting evidence that growth 
has caused exports but failing to find a causal link from exports to growth 
(Ahmad and Harnihirun, 1992, 1995). Singapore, however, seems to be 
the exception, with exports both causing and being caused by economic 
growth (Ahmad and Harnihirun, 1995). One can speculate why this might 
be the case, but given the experiences of many other countries there 
remains a strong case for seeking to promote greater trade openness and, in 
particular, higher levels of exports throughout ASEAN and, in particular, 
the CLMV group. Achieving higher levels of openness, both in terms of the 
levels of exports and imports relative to GDP, and in terms of policy stance, 
among the CLMV group will help address the ASEAN development gap. 
Further discussion of this issue is provided in Chapter Five. 
Human capital has traditionally been defined as the stock of 
competencies, skills and knowledge possessed by individuals to produce 
economic value. As such it is associated with achievements in education 
and training. The definition of human capital can be extended to include 
the ability to produce such value, and therefore is associated with 
achievements in health. A person with low achievements in health will 
obviously be constrained in the economic value they produce. 
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Economists have long been aware of the importance of human capital 
for economic growth, with discussion of it gaining prominence in late 
1950s and early 1960s from contributions such as that of Schultz (1961). 
That education and training is in general a key driver of growth is 
unchallenged, as a number of key studies have shown (see, for example, 
Barro, 1991, 2001; Romer, 1993). What is debated is whether all aspects 
and types of educational achievements drive growth. Romer (2001), 
analysing a sample of 100 countries for the period 1960-1995, found that 
growth was positively related to the average years of school attainment of 
adult males at the secondary and higher levels but not significantly related 
to years of school attainment of females at these levels or to years of 
primary attainment by either sex. Some studies point to investments in 
education having a limited short-run effect, and others have questioned the 
link between educational attainment and growth, including Benhabib and 
Spiegel (1994) and Pritchett (1997). While questions regarding short-run 
effects remain, later research has suggested that the doubts about 
educational attainment were due to the impact of unrepresentative 
observations in the datasets under question. As such there is now a case for 
disregarding this research. 
What must not be disregarded is research on the drivers of health and 
educational achievements. These are development achievements that are 
of value in their own right, irrespective of their impact on growth. As 
such, information on these drivers is of dual benefit. Surveying the drivers 
of the many different types of health and education achievements is an 
enormous task that is beyond the scope of this chapter. But it is instructive 
to point to some key messages that emerge from the literature. The first is 
that while economic growth is a key driver, there is much more to these 
achievements than growth alone, with some countries achieving much 
higher levels of health and education than their income levels alone would 
predict (McGillivray, 2005). There are several other drivers of these 
achievements that can be stimulated by government policy. Public 
expenditure accompanied by the effective delivery of health and 
education services are the most obvious drivers. Good quality health and 
education systems are required, more generally. This not only relates to 
service delivery and funding, but also to the use of human resources, the 
provision of information, the quality of medical and educational products 
and technologies, and leadership and governance (WHO, 2007; Glewwe 
and Kremer, 2005). There are also important social determinants of both 
health and education achievement, including poverty, social exclusion 
and gender discrimination. As Glewwe and Kremer (2005) and many 
others observe, there is often a pro-rich bias in the provision of education 
services. The same applies to health services. Such bias is a significant 
constraint to higher health and education attainment in developing 
countries. 
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In 2000, the WHO ranked 190 countries on the basis of the performance 
of their health systems (WHO, 2000). It no longer provides such a ranking 
now owing to the complexity of the task, and the 2000 ranking was 
controversial. It is now, of course, rather dated. With these points in mind 
it is instructive to consider the rankings of the ASEAN countries. The 
CLMV countries were ranked among those with the worst performing 
health systems. Viet Nam's ranking out of the 190 countries was 160. Lao 
PDR, Cambodia and Myanmar were ranked 165, 174 and 190 respectively. 
Of the ASEAN-6 countries, Singapore was ranked at position 6. The 
rankings of Brunei Darussalam, Thailand, Malaysia, Philippines and 
Indonesia were 40, 47, 48, 69 and 92 respectively. One would hope that 
these gaps have diminished substantially. If not, they must be seen as a 
major issue in addressing the ASEAN development gap, and be given very 
high priority in policy interventions. 
The financial sector provides financial services to commercial and retail 
customers and consists of banks, credit unions, financiers (including micro-
finance providers), insurance companies, investment fund managers and all 
other organisations that manage money. There is a compelling case that 
financial sector development is an important driver of economic growth in 
developing countries. Zhuang et al. (2009) and Brooks et al. (2010) note 
that a well-functioning financial sector mobilises and pools domestic 
savings, enhances resource allocation by effectively transmitting 
information, exerts pressure to improve corporate governance, facilitates 
trade and diversification and the better management of risks, and promotes 
the exchange of goods and services. Through these impacts, financial 
sector development drives economic growth not only by promoting private 
sector expansion, but also by supporting public sector investment in 
physical infrastructure and enabling households to invest in human capital 
and smooth consumption (Zhuang et al., 2009). 
There is an enormous research literature on financial sector development 
and growth. There have been many surveys of this literature, including 
Honohan (2004), DFID (2004), Levine (2004), Andrianova and 
Demetriades (2008} and Zhaung et al. (2009). While there was some 
disagreement in the early research, there is now overwhelming and robust 
empirical evidence that financial sector development contributes to higher 
economic growth. For example, building on the influential research of 
Goldsmith (1969), King and Levine (1993a, 1993b) find that for 80 
countries over the period 1960 to 1989, financial development is positively 
associated with growth. Increasing financial depth (measured by the ratio 
of liquid liabilities to GDP) was found to be particularly important, as it 
increased a country's per capita income growth rate by almost one 
percentage point per year. They also found that the depth of the financial 
sector accounts for 20 per cent of the difference in per capita income 
growth performance between the highest and lowest quartile of performers 
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over the 30-year period from 1960 to 1989. King and Levine's results also 
suggest that the level of financial depth in 1960 is a good predictor of 
subsequent rates of economic growth, capital accumulation and 
productivity growth over the next 30 years, even after controlling for 
income level, education, and measures of monetary, trade and fiscal 
policies (King and Levine 1993a, 1993b, cited in Zhuang et al., 2009). This 
finding is consistent with a number of other empirical studies that suggest 
the positive impact of financial sector deepening on economic growth 
appears to be greater for developing countries than for developed countries 
(Calderon and Liu, 2003; Jalilian and Kirkpatrick, 2005; Kumbhakar and 
Mavrotas, 2008; Mavrotas and Son, 2006). Zhuang et al. (2009) cite a 
number of studies pointing to the benefits of financial sector development 
in Southeast Asia. 
While the evidence of the important role of financial sector development 
in supporting growth is reasonably clear, it is equally clear that such 
developments are no panacea insofar as growth is concerned. That is, in 
order for it to be effective in this regard it needs to be accompanied by a 
range of support services, including the provision of training and capacity 
building and assistance in accessing markets and technologies. Financial 
sector development and innovation will also bring risks, and as such it is 
important to maintain sound macroeconomic management, put in place 
effective regulatory and supervisory mechanisms, and carry out structural 
reforms in developing the financial sector (Zhuang et al., 2009). This will 
need to be kept in mind among ASEAN countries should financial sector 
development be relied upon to reduce the development gap among them. 
That noted, based on the wealth of evidence on the impact of financial 
sector development, ignoring this sector could well be at the cost of a larger 
development gap than would otherwise be the case. 
Governance has long been acknowledged as an important driver of 
growth, increasingly so over recent decades. Often also referred or linked 
to institutional quality, governance is the manner in which authority is 
exercised in the management of a nation's resources. The positive 
association between governance and institutional quality, and economic 
growth and income levels is very well established. Institutional quality and 
governance enable the enforcement of property rights and contracts that 
facilitate market exchange, investment and innovation, and reduce 
transactions costs (Acemoglu et al., 2001; Aron, 2000; North, 1990; 
Rodrik et al., 2002). Empirical research points to governance and 
institutional quality being associated with higher economic growth and 
income levels (Campos and Nugent, 1998; Barro, 1999; Acemoglu et al., 
2001; Lee and Kim, 2009), higher levels of public and private investment 
(Knack and Keefer, 1995; Rodrik, 2003), higher levels of human capital 
(Arimah, 2004) and greater sustainability of common resource pools 
(Ostrom, 2005). 
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Accountability, transparency, rule of law, political stability, 
bureaucratic capability, property rights protection and contract 
enforcement, and control of corruption are now regarded as key and 
mutually reinforcing aspects of growth-enhancing institutions. ASEAN 
countries, in particular the CLMV group, will need to continue to strive 
for improvements in each of these areas if the development gap is to be 
reduced. Control of corruption is an area in which CLMV countries 
especially will have to work, based on the 2011 Transparency 
International Perceptions of Corruption Index. While Singapore was 
ranked number 6 according to this index, Viet Nam, Lao PDR, Cambodia 
and Myanmar were ranked number 112, 154, 164 and 180 respectively 
out of 182 countries (Transparency International, 2012). 
Labour mobility involves the flow of people, or migration, and has 
emerged as a key issue in development. Two aspects of labour mobility are 
central to its development implications: brain drain and remittance flows. 
Brain drain occurs when the source country loses skilled personnel to the 
host country. This can have significant adverse implications for countries 
where the earnings of personnel are relatively low. Skilled personnel can 
leave these countries seeking higher earnings abroad, leaving a skill 
shortage at home. The impact of brain drain for the host country need not 
necessarily be adverse, as Beine et al. (2001) note. This is because it can 
foster investments in education and training in the source country, leading 
to a higher average level of human capital than would otherwise be the 
case. Whether brain drain has an overall adverse impact on income growth 
depends on the relative strengths of the two impacts. There is little 
empirical evidence on the relative strengths of the impacts, although Beine 
et al. (2001) find that the beneficial impact of higher average human capital 
outweighs the impact of the outward flow of skilled personnel. In an 
interesting analysis, Mountford (1997) shows that when migration is not a 
certainty, a brain drain may increase both average productivity and 
equality in the source economy. 
The impacts of remittances have been extensively researched. This is 
no surprise, as remittances are an important source of foreign income for 
developing countries, increasing dramatically in size over recent decades. 
Arising primarily from migration of un- or semi-skilled workers, 
developing country remittance receipts were US$ 0.3 billion in 1971. 
These receipts are expected to reach US$ 350 billion in 2011, up from 
US$ 320 billion in the previous year. Remittances now account for more 
than two and a half times the global level of Official Development 
Assistance (ODA), having accounted for less than 5 per cent of the level 
of ODA in 1971 (World Bank, 2011a, 2011b). They flow directly to 
households rather than governments, which can be advantageous, as they 
can serve as a de facto social safety net in difficult times, and can offset 
macroeconomic volatility. 
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It is not surprising, therefore, that there is a large and growing research 
literature on the economic impacts of remittances in developing countries. 
A number of empirical studies have looked at the impact of remittance 
inflows on the economic growth rates of these countries. Catrinescu et al. 
(2009), Jongwanich (2007) and Pradhan et al. (2008) find some evidence 
of a positive association between remittance receipts and growth while 
other studies find the impact varies according to a country's educational 
attainment, financial market depth and quality of institutions (Giuliano 
and Ruiz-Arranz, 2009; World Bank, 2006; Ramirez and Sharma, 2008). 
Ang (2007) reports a positive and statistically significant impact of 
remittances on growth in the Philippines. Feeny et al. (2012) report the 
same finding for small island developing states (SIDS), and find that, in the 
absence of remittances, growth in South Pacific SIDS would have been 
negative for the period 1971-2010. Other studies have examined the 
impacts of remittance inflows on known drivers of growth. L6pez-C6rdova 
(2006) and Acosta et al. (2007) looked at impacts on human capital, 
Aggarwal et al. (2011) and Demirgii<;-Kunt et al. (2011) were concerned 
with impacts on financial development, Chami et al. (2003) and Jackman 
et al. (2009) examined impacts on investment volatility, and Amuedo-
Dorantes and Pozo (2004) investigated the impacts on the real exchange 
rate, reporting mixed evidence. 
Regardless of what the impact of brain drain and remittances on growth 
of per capita income might be, the point remains that migration can be 
made to work for source countries. The potentially harmful impact of 
skilled labour losses owing to brain drain can be offset by the potentially 
positive impacts of a more highly skilled workforce and remittance flows. 
Ensuring a freer flow of migrants of all levels of skills among ASEAN 
countries, and in particular from CLMV to ASEAN-6 countries, is 
therefore one way to narrow the development gap. 
Foreign direct investment {FDI) can play a crucial role in contributing to 
income growth in host countries. It not only augments local investment but 
can potentially lead to increased technology, better managerial expertise, 
increased research and development, and productivity and efficiency gains. 
It will promote higher growth in the long run if it generates improvements 
in technology (Solow, 1957; de Mello, 1997) or improvements in human 
capital (Lucas, 1988; Rebelo, 1991; Romer, 1986). Yet it is not without its 
critics, who argue that policies to attract FDI can distort domestic 
incentives and displace domestic investment, crowding out employment 
and the activities of domestic firms. 
There is a large empirical literature on FDI and growth. Studies include 
Alfaro et el. (2004), Borensztein et al. (1998), Bornschier et al. (1978), 
Carkovic and Levine (2005), de Mello (1999), Doucouliagos et al. (2011), 
Lensink and Morrissey (2006), Mankiw et al. (1992) and Papanek (1973). 
The consensus of this literature is that the impact of FDI has been 
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favourable in that growth would be lower in host developing countries if it 
were not for FDI. This does, however, depend on a number of contingencies, 
with the incremental impact of FDI varying across host countries. In a 
meta-analysis, Doucouliagos et al. (2011) find that the impact of FDI varies 
across these countries according to levels of financial development, trade 
and human capital. A number of empirical studies point to FDI being an 
important driver of income growth in many of the ASEAN-6 countries. 
Hsiao and Hsiao (2006) point to a bidirectional relationship between FDI 
and growth for a sample of countries that includes Malaysia, Philippines, 
Singapore and Thailand. Fan and Dickie (2000) found that for Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand FDI contributed between 4 
and over 20 per cent of GDP during 1987 to 1997. 
This research provides a compelling reason for seeking to increase FDI 
flows to the CLMV countries as one means of decreasing the ASEAN 
development gap. But it is also clear that FDI alone will not sustain higher 
growth rates in these countries. It should not crowd out domestic economic 
activity, and needs to be led to or be accompanied by higher levels of 
human capital, improvements in technology and financial sector 
development. In this context the encouragement of FDI in Cambodia, Lao 
PDR and Viet Nam in most sectors is a welcome development, although the 
downward trend in FDI to Myanmar since the early 2000s is a matter of 
concern (Menon and Melendez, 2011; Menon, 2012). 
External development finance consists of a number of inflows including 
export credits, portfolio investment and official development finance. 
Official development finance from OECD countries, the largest providers, 
consists of ODA and other official finance, the latter not being sufficiently 
concessional to be classified as ODA. ODA is also more popularly known 
as foreign aid. The developmental effectiveness of foreign aid, including its 
impact on economic growth, is a contentious topic. Brooks et al. (2010: 21) 
recognise this, commenting that the 'role of official development assistance 
in closing development gaps has been mixed and at times controversial'. 
In looking at the literature on aid and growth it is instructive to 
distinguish between studies published in the late 1990s and earlier. The 
earlier studies were largely inconclusive, either finding that aid increased, 
decreased or had no impact on growth or a key driver, savings. If an overall 
conclusion is possible from this literature it is that aid had no impact on 
growth in recipient countries (McGillivray et al., 2006). The late 1990s 
marked a significant change in the aid-growth literature, commencing with 
the influential study by Burnside and Dollar (2000), which concluded that 
aid can work if recipient governments had 'good' policies. Subsequent 
studies, including Burnside and Dollar, used better data, theory and 
empirical techniques than those that preceded them. There have been 
numerous comprehensive surveys of the more recent aid-growth literature, 
which consists of scores of studies. These surveys include Morrissey (2001), 
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Clemens et al. (2004), Dalgaard et al. (2004), Addison et al. (2005), 
McGillivray et al. (2006) and Feeny and McGillivray (2011). All point to 
the literature concluding that growth would have been lower in the absence 
of aid. The results of a number of studies suggest that growth in recipient 
countries would be in the vicinity of one percent points lower in the absence 
of aid (Feeny and McGillivray, 2011). 
That the aid-growth literature surveys point to growth being lower in 
recipient countries in the absence of aid does not mean that there are no 
contrary voices emanating from empirical research circles. Doucouliagos 
and Paldam (2008) conducted a meta-analysis of the aid-growth literature 
and found that aid has failed to stimulate income growth. Mekasha and 
Tarp (2011) looked closely at the Doucouliagos and Paldam analysis and 
suggested that its results were not robust owing to a number of technical 
issues. Rajan and Subramanian (2008) could not find a positive association 
between aid and growth. This widely cited paper has been extremely 
influential in policy circles, and has led observers to conclude that it is 
evidence that aid has been ineffective in promoting growth. This is a 
misinterpretation of the paper's results. Rajan and Subramanian simply 
could not find a link between aid and growth, which is not to say that such 
a link does not exist. That so many other studies have found the link 
suggests it does indeed exist. 
The results of empirical research on aid notwithstanding, it remains 
the case that there is widespread disappointment with aid effectiveness, 
as is evident in the remarks of Brooks et al. (2010) quoted above. What 
are the grounds for this disappointment? It is reasonable to speculate that 
it stems from too lofty expectations of aid in the first place. In the early 
days of aid to developing countries, and in part consistent with the 
success of the Marshal Plan in Europe after World War Two, it was 
expected that aid alone would put developing countries on a path to self-
sustaining growth and would eventually rid the world of poverty. That it 
has not, and that as global aid has increased over time so has the 
incidence of global poverty, is perhaps at the heart of the disappointment 
and the reason why so many have considered aid as a failed enterprise. It 
needs to be remembered, however, that aid, has, on average, over the last 
40 years roughly been 1to1.5 per cent of recipient country GDP. At these 
levels one can hardly realistically say that aid has been a failure, although 
one might be able to argue that the aid effort, by not leading to larger 
amounts of aid, has been. A better question is to ask whether economic 
growth, and poverty incidence, would have been lower in the absence of 
aid. The aid-growth literature quoted above suggests the answer to this 
question is yes. 
What does this mean for aid and the ASEAN development gap? 
Unfortunately, we do not have a research literature on the impact of aid 
on growth to ASEAN countries on which conclusions about its 
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effectiveness to these countries can be judged. What is also unfortunate is 
that the aid-growth literature does not provide a consensus on the 
mechanisms through which aid leads to growth. As mentioned, Burnside 
and Dollar (1997, 2000) argue that the impact of aid on growth is 
contingent on the policy regime of recipient countries. Subsequent 
research rejects this contingency, instead pointing to factors such as 
economic vulnerability, democracy and climate (McGillivray, 2003}. This 
lack of consensus is unfortunate as guidance for policy aimed at 
increasing aid effectiveness is not provided. 
This is not, however, to imply that such guidance does not exist. It does, 
in the form of the Paris Declaration principles. These principles emanated 
from the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, which was adopted by the 
international community at the 2005 Paris High Level Forum on Aid 
Effectiveness, hosted by the French government and organised by the 
OECD. Based on decades of lessons from the practice of delivering aid to 
developing countries, the five principles are as follows. 
1 Ownership-developing countries must lead their own development 
policies and strategies, and manage their own development work on 
the ground. 
2 Alignment-donors must line up their aid firmly behind the priorities 
outlined in developing countries' national development strategies, they 
should use partner country systems, their aid must be untied and be 
predictable. 
3 Harmonisation-donors must coordinate their development work 
better among themselves to avoid duplication and high transaction 
costs for poor countries. 
4 Managing for results-all parties in the aid relationship must place 
more focus on the result of aid, the tangible difference it makes in poor 
people's lives. 
5 Mutual accountability-donors and developing countries must 
account more transparently to each other for their use of aid funds, 
and to their citizens and parliaments for the impact of their aid 
(OECD, 2005). 
Aid to the CLMV countries that is consistent with the Paris principles will 
enhance its impact on growth and in turn reduce the ASEAN development 
gap. This does, however, require that relative to the size of their economies 
and populations, the CLMV countries receive larger shares of total ASEAN 
aid receipts than their ASEAN-6 counterparts. If we accept that aid flows 
are effective in promoting growth in per capita incomes and greater 
achievements in health and education, giving preference to the ASEAN-6 
over CLMV countri~s will exacerbate the existing gap. This issue is 
explored further in Chapter Five. 
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Conclusion 
The preceding discussion demonstrated that a real and measureable 
development gap exists between the CLMV countries and the ASEAN-6. 
The gap in human development achievement has been gradually 
decreasing over time, but the gap in income has increased by 10 per cent 
over the last decade or so. With regards to poverty, the analysis in this 
chapter has demonstrated that by far the largest number of poor people 
live in the ASEAN-6 countries, almost entirely in Indonesia and the 
Philippines, but that the depth of poverty and its intensity is greater in the 
CLMV countries. That is to say that the poor in the CLMV are poorer 
than the poor in the ASEAN-6. This chapter also suggested, very 
conservatively, how long it will take CLMV countries to reach the average 
development achievements of the ASEAN-6. This analysis suggested that 
it will be at least two decades before we see some significant convergence 
in most indicators, although some countries, most notably Viet Nam, will 
converge with ASEAN-6 much eariler and indeed convergence in some 
areas is already being observed. 
This chapter also highlighted the various drivers of the development gap 
and commented on issues that should be considered when developing 
policy responses to narrow the gap. This analysis suggested that the impact 
of these drivers will be variable across countries depending on their 
development achievements to date and on their capacity. A clear theme 
running through this analysis is the importance of improving governance 
and institutional quality to more expeditiously narrow the gap. These 
issues will be discussed at length through this book. 
Appendix 
2.1 Estimation of Years Required for Elimination of ASEAN 
Development Gap Based on Recent Trends 
The number of years was estimated in two steps. The first step involved 
fitting the following regression equation to annual development 
achievement data for the period 2000-2011: 
dt =a+ ~t + µt 
where dt is the ASEAN country development achievement (in health, 
education or income) in question in period t, tis time, a is an intercept, ~a 
regression coefficient and µt is a residual. The first observation of the time 
variable is 2000 and the last is 2011. The equation was fitted to the data 
using the ordinary least squares method. 
The estimate of the number of years required to eliminate the gap was 
obtained in the second step. This involved solving for n in the following equation: 
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where dw11 is either the highest development achievement in question 
among all ASEAN countries or the average achievement in question among 
the ASEAN-6 group in 2011, d is the achievement of the country in 
question in 2011, vd is the arithmetic mean of the development achievement 
in question during 2000-2011 and n is the number of years required to 
eliminate the gap. 
2.2 Calculation of Disparity in Development Achievements: The Theil 
Entropy Measure 
The following Theil Entropy measure was used to quantify development 
disparities or inequalities among all ASEAN countries: 
where Id is inequality in the development achievement in question, <Dd is the 
arithmetic mean of the development achievement among all ASEAN 
countries, j is the total number of ASEAN countries and d is that 
achievement for ASEAN country I and In denotes natural logarithm. 
Note 
1 It must be noted that ASEAN, through the ASEANstats Division, currently 
compiles the same indicators used in this study, excluding the GNI per capita 
$PPP, but as provided by the national statistical bodies. 
References 
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S. and Robinson, J. (2001) 'The Colonial Origin of 
Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation', American Economic 
Review, 91(5): 1369-1401. 
Acosta, P., Fajnzylber, P. and Lopez, J.H. (2007) The Impact of Remittances on 
Poverty and Human Capital: Evidence from Latin American Household Surveys, 
Policy Research Working Paper Series 424 7. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. 
Addison, T., Mavrotas, G. and McGillivray, M. (2005) 'Development Assistance 
and Development Finance: Evidence and Global Policy Agendas', journal of 
International Development, 17(6): 819-836. 
Aggarwal, R., Demirgiic;-Kunt, A. and Martinez Peria, M.S. (2011) 'Do 
Remittances Promote Financial Development?', journal of Development 
Economics, 96: 255-264. 
58 Mark McGillivray, Simon Feeny and Sasi Iamsiraroj 
Ahmad, ]. and Harnhirun, S. (1992) The Causality between Exports and 
Economic Growth in the ASEAN Countries: Cointegration and Error 
Correction Model Approach, Department of Economics Working Paper DP 
9212. Montreal: Concordia University. 
---{1995) 'Unit Roots and Cointegration in Estimating Causality Between 
Exports and Economic Growth: Empirical Evidence from the ASEAN 
Countries', Economic Letters, 49(3): 329-334. 
---{1996) 'Cointegration and Causality between Exports and Economic Growth: 
Evidence from ASEAN Countries', Canadian Journal of Economics, 29: 413-
417. 
Alavi, R. and Ramadan, A. (2008) 'Narrowing Development Gaps in ASEAN', 
Journal of Economic Co-operation, 29(1): 29-60. 
Alfaro, L., Chanda, A., Kalemli-Ozcan, S. and Sayek, S. (2004) 'FDI and 
Economic Growth: The Role of Local Financial Markets', Journal of 
International Economics, 64(1): 89-112. 
Alkire, S. (2002) 'Dimensions of Human Development', World Development, 
30(2): 542-562. 
Alkire, S. and Santos, M.E. (2010) Acute Multidimensional Poverty: A New Index 
for Developing Countries, OPHI Working Paper No. 38. Oxford: Oxford 
Poverty and Human Development Initiative, University of Oxford. 
Amuedo-Dorantes, C. and Pozo, S. (2004) 'Workers' Remittances and the Real 
Exchange Rate: A Paradox of Gifts', World Development, 32(8): 1407-1417. 
Andrianova, S. and Demetriades, P. (2008) 'Sources and Effectiveness of Financial 
Development: What We Know and What We Need to Know, in B. Guha-
Khasnobis and G. Mavrotas (eds), Financial Development, Institutions, 
Growth and Poverty Reduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Ang, A. (2007) Workers' Remittances and Economic Growth in the Philippines, 
Paper presented at the Dynamics, Economic Growth, and International Trade 
Conference, Melbourne. 
Arimah, B. (2004) 'Poverty Reduction and Human Development in Africa', 
Journal of Human Development, 5(3): 399-415. 
Aron, J. (2000) 'Growth and Institutions: A Review of the Evidence', World Bank 
Research Observer, 15(1): 99-135. 
Balassa, B. (1978) 'Exports and Economic Growth: Further Evidence', Journal of 
Development Economics, 5: 181-189. 
---{1985) 'Exports, Policy Choices and Economic Growth In Developing Countries 
after the 1973 Oil Shock', Journal of Development Economics, 18: 23-35. 
Barro, R. (1991} 'Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries', The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106(2): 407-443. 
---{1999) Determinants of Economic Growth: A Cross-country Empirical 
Study. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
---{2001) 'Human Capital, Growth, History and Policy', American Economic 
Review, 91(2): 12-17. 
Beine, M., Docquier, F. and Rapoport, H. (2001) 'Brain Drain and Economic 
Growth: Theory and Evidence', Journal of Development Economics, 64(1}: 
275-289. 
Understanding the ASEAN Development Gap 59 
Benhabib, ]. and Spi~gel, M. (1994) 'The Role of Human Capital in Economic 
Development: Evidence from Aggregate Cross-country Data', Journal of 
Monetary Economics, 34(2): 143-174. 
Borensztein, E., De Gregorio, J. and Lee, J.-W. (1998) 'How Does Foreign Direct 
Investment Affect Economic Growth?', journal of International Economics, 
45: 115-135. 
Bornschier, V., Chase-Dunn, C. and Rubinson, R. (1978) 'Cross-national Evidence 
of the Effects of Foreign Investment and Aid on Economic Growth and 
Inequality: A Survey of Findings and Reanalysis', The American Journal of 
Sociology, 84(3): 651-683. 
Brooks, D., Hasan, R., Lee, J.-W., Son, H. and Zhuang, J. (2010) Closing 
Development Gaps: Challenges and Policy Options, ADB Economics Working 
Paper Series, No. 209. Manila: Asian Development Bank. 
Burnside, C. and Dollar, D. (2000) 'Aid, Policies and Growth', American 
Economic Review, 90(4): 847-868. 
Calderon, C. and Liu, L. (2003) 'The Direction of Causality Between Financial 
Development and Economic Growth', journal of Development Economics, 
72(1): 321-334. 
Calderon, C. and Serven, L. (2004) The Effects of Infrastructure Development on 
Growth and Income Distribution, Working Papers, Central Bank of Chile 270. 
Santiago, Chile: Central Bank of Chile. 
Campos, N. and Nugent, J. (1998) 'Institutions and Growth: Can Human Capital 
Be a Link?', CEPAL Review, 64 {April): 7-27. 
Carkovic, M. and Levine, R. (2005) 'Does Foreign Direct Investment Accelerate 
Economic Growth?', in T.H. Moran, E.M. Graham and M. Blomstrom (eds), 
Does Foreign Direct Investment Promote Development? Washington, D.C.: 
Institute for International Economics. 
Catrinescu, N., Leon-Ledesma, M., Piracha, M. and Quillin, B. (2009) 
'Remittances, Institutions, and Economic Growth', World Development, 37(1): 
81-92. 
Chami, R., Fullenkamp, C. and Jahjah, S. (2003) Are Immigrant Remittance 
Flows a Source of Capital for Development?, IMF Working Paper WP/03/189. 
Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund. 
Clemens, M., Radelet, S. and Bhavani, R. (2004) Counting Chickens When They 
Hatch: The Short-Term Effect of Aid on Growth, Center for Global 
Development Working Paper no. 44. Washington, D.C.: Center for Global 
Development. 
Commission on Growth and Development (2008) The Growth Report: Strategies 
for Sustained Growth and Inclusive Development. Washington, D.C.: World 
Bank on behalf of the Commission on Growth and Development. 
Coudouel, A., Hentschel, J.S. and Wodon, Q.T. (2002) 'Poverty Measurement and 
Analysis', World Bank Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers Sourcebook. 
Washington, D.C.: World Bank. 
Dalgaard, C., Hansen, H. and Tarp, F. (2004) 'On the Empirics of Foreign Aid and 
Growth', Economic journal, 114(496): F191-F216. 
de Mello, L.R. (1997) 'Foreign Direct Investment in Developing Countries and 
Growth: A Selective Survey', journal of Development Studies, 34(1): 1-34. 
60 Mark McGillivray, Simon Feeny and Sasi Iamsiraroj 
--{1999) 'Foreign Direct Investment-led Growth: Evidence from Time Series and 
Panel Data', Oxford Economic Papers, 51: 133-151. 
Demirgii~-Kunt, A., Cordova, E.L., Peria, M. and Woodruff, C. (2011) 
'Remittances and Banking Sector Breadth and Depth: Evidence from Mexico', 
Journal of Development Economics, 95: 229-241. 
DFID (2004) The Importance of Financial Sector Development for Growth and 
Poverty Reduction, Policy Division Working Paper, Financial Sector Team. 
London: Department for International Development. 
Dollar, D. (1992) 'Outward-oriented Developing Economies Really Do Grow 
More Rapidly: Evidence from 95 LDCs, 1976-85', Economic Development 
and Cultural Change, 40: 523-544. 
Doucouliagos, H. and Paldam, M. (2008) 'Aid Effectiveness on Growth: A Meta 
Study', European Journal of Political Economy, 24: 1-24. 
Doucouliagos, H., Iamsiraroj, S. and Ulubasoglu, M.A. (2011} 'Foreign Direct 
Investment and Economic Growth: A Real Relationship or Wishful Thinking?', 
Deakin University, mirneo. 
Edwards, S. (1993) 'Openness, Trade, Liberalization, and Growth in Developing 
Countries', Journal of Economic Literature, 31: 1358-1393. 
--{1997) Openness, Productivity and Growth: What Do We Really Know?, NBER 
Working Paper No. 5978. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Fan, X. and Dickie, P.M. (2000) 'The Contribution of Foreign Direct Investment 
to Growth and Stability: A Post-crisis ASEAN-5 Review', ASEAN Economic 
Bulletin, 17: 312-323. 
Feder, G. (1982) 'On Exports and Economic Growth', Journal of Development 
Economics, 12: 59-73. 
Feeny, S. and McGillivray, M. (2011) 'Scaling-up Foreign Aid: Will the "Big Push" 
Work?', The World Economy, 34(1): 54-73. 
Feeny, S., Iamsiraroj, S. and McGillivray, M. (2012) Remittances and Economic 
Growth: Larger Impacts in Smaller Countries?, Alfred Deakin Research 
Institute. Available at: http://sustineo.corn.au/sites/default/files/publications/ 
spdi-1-12 _growth __ remittances_in_sids. pdf 
Firebaugh, G. (1999) 'Empirics of World Income Inequality', The American 
journal of Sociology, 104: 1597-1630. 
Fukuda, S. and Toya, H. (1995) 'Conditional Growth Convergence in East Asian 
Countries: The Role of Exports in Economic Growth', in T. Ito and A. Krueger 
(eds), Growth Theories in Light of the East Asian Experience. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Gasper, D. (2007) 'Human Well-being: Concepts and Conceptualizations' in 
M. McGillivray (ed.), Human Well-being: Concept and Measurement. New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Giuliano, P. and Ruiz-Arranz, M. (2009) 'Remittances, Financial Development, 
and Growth',]ournal of Development Economics, 90(1): 144-152. 
Glewwe, P. and Kremer, M. (2005) Schools, Teachers and Educational Outcomes 
in Developing Countries, CID Working Paper No. 122. Cambridge, MA: 
Center for International Development at Harvard University. 
Goldsmith, R.W. (1969) Financial Structure and Development. New Haven: Yale 
University Press. 
Understanding the ASEAN Development Gap 61 
Honohan, P. (2004) 'Financial Development, Growth and Poverty: How Close are 
the Links?' in E.C. Goodhard (ed.), Financial Development and Economic 
Growth: Explaining the Links. London: Palgrave. 
Hsiao, F. and Hsiao, M. (2006) 'FDI, exports, and GDP in East and Southeast 
Asia-Panel data versus Time-series Causality Analyses', journal of Asian 
Economics, 17: 1082-1106. 
Jackman, M., Craigwell, R. and Moore, W. (2009) 'Economic Volatility and 
Remittances: Evidence from SIDS', Journal of Economic Studies, 36(2): 135-146. 
Jalilian, H. and Kirkpatrick, C. (2005) 'Does Financial Development Contribute to 
Poverty Reduction?',]ournal of Development Studies, 41(4): 636-656. 
Jongwanich, J. {2007) Workers, Remittances, Economic Growth and Poverty in 
Developing Asia and the Pacific Countries, UNESCAP Working Paper 
WP/07/01. Bangkok: UNESCAP. 
King, R.G. and Levine, R. (1993a} 'Finance and Growth: Schumpeter Might be 
Right', Quarterly journal of Economics, 108(3): 717-737. 
---{1993b) 'Finance, Entrepreneurship and Growth: Theory and Evidence', 
Journal of Monetary Economics, 32(3): 513-542. 
Knack, S. and Keefer, P. (1995) 'Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross 
Country Test Using Alternative Institutional Measures', Economics and 
Politics, 7(3): 207-227. 
Kumbhakar, S. and Mavrotas, G. (2008) 'Financial Sector Development and 
Productivity Growth' in B. Guha-Khasnobis and G. Mavrotas (eds), Financial 
Development, Institutions, Growth and Poverty Reduction. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Lee, K. and Kim, B.-Y. (2009) 'Both Institutions and Policies Matter but Differently 
for Different Income Groups of Countries: Determinants of Long-Run 
Economic Growth Revisited', World Development, 37(3): 533-549. 
Lensink, R. and Morrissey, 0. (2006) 'Foreign Direct Investment: Flows, 
Volatility, and the Impact on Growth', Review of International Economics, 
14(3): 478-493. 
Levine, R. (2004) Finance and Growth: Theory and Evidence, NBER Working 
Paper No. 10766. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research. 
L6pez-C6rdova, E. (2006) Globalization, Migration and Development: The Role 
of the Mexican Migrant Remittances, INTAL-ITD Working Paper No. 20. 
Buenos Aires: Institute for the Integration of Latin America and the Caribbean, 
Trade and Hemispheric Issues Division. 
Lucas, R.E. (1988) 'On the Mechanics of Economic Development', journal of 
Monetary Economics, 22(1): 3-42. 
McGillivray, M. (2003) 'Aid Effectiveness and Selectivity: Integrating Multiple 
Objectives into Aid Allocation', DAC Journal, 4(3): 27-40. 
--(2005) 'Measuring Non-Economic Well-being Achievement', Review of 
Income and Wealth, 51(2): 337-364. 
--(2010) 'Global Inequality in Health: Disparities in Human Longevity among 
Countries', in M. McGillivray, I. Dutta and D. Lawson (eds), Health Inequality 
and Development. London: Palgrave-Macmillan. 
McGillivray, M. and Markova, N. (2010) 'Global Inequality in Well-being 
Dimensions', journal of Development Studies, 46(2): 371-378. 
62 Mark McGillivray, Simon Feeny and Sasi Iamsiraroj 
McGillivray, M., Feeny, S., Hermes, N. and Lensink, R. (2006) 'Controversies 
Over the Impact of Development Aid: It Works; It Doesn't; It Can, But that 
Depends,' Journal of International Development, 18(7): 1031-1050. 
Mankiw, G.N., Romer, D. and Weil, D.N. (1992) 'A Contribution to the Empirics 
of Economic Growth', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107(2): 407-437. 
Mavrotas, G. and Son, S. (2006) 'Financial Sector Development and Growth: Re-
examining the Nexus', in M. Bagella, L. Becchetti, and I. Hasan (eds), 
Transparency, Governance and Markets. Oxford: Elsevier. 
Mekasha, T.J. and Tarp, F. (2011) Aid and Growth: What Meta-analysis Reveals, 
UNU-WIDER Working Paper. Helsinki: World Institute for Development 
Economic Research. 
Menon, J. (2012) Narrowing the Development Divide in ASEAN: The Role of 
Policy, ADB Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration, No. 100. 
Manila: Asian Development Bank. 
Menon, J. and Melendez, A. (2011) Trade and Investment in the Greater Mekong 
Subregion: Remaining Challenges and Unfinished Policy Agenda, ADB 
Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration, No. 78. Manila: 
Asian Development Bank. 
Milanovic, B. (2005) Worlds Apart: Measuring International and Global 
Inequality. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press. 
Morrissey, 0. (2001) 'Does Aid Increase Growth?', Progress in Development 
Studies, 1(1): 37-50. 
Mountford, A. (1997) 'Can a Braindrain be Good for Growth in the Source 
Economy?', Journal of Development Economics, 53(2): 287-303. 
North, D. (1990) Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
OECD (2005) The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. Paris: Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development. 
Ostrom, E. (2005) Understanding Institutional Diversity. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
Papanek, G.F. {1973) 'Aid, Foreign Private Investment, Savings, and Growth in 
Less Developed Countries', Journal of Political Economy, 81(1): 120-130. 
Pradhan, G., Upadhyay, M. and Upadhyaya, K. (2008) 'Remittances and Economic 
Growth in Developing Countries', European] ournal of Development Research, 
20(3): 497-506. 
Pritchett, L. (1997) Where Has All the Education Gone?, World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper No. 1581. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. 
Rajan, R. and Subramanian, A. (2008) 'Aid and Growth: What Does the Cross-
Country Evidence Really Show?', Review of Economics and Statistics, 90(4): 
643-665. 
Ramirez, M.D. and Sharma, H. (2008) Remittances and Growth in Latin 
America: A Panel Unit Root and Panel Cointegration Analysis, Department of 
Economics Working Paper No. 51. New Haven: Yale University. 
Rebelo, S. (1991) 'Long-run Policy Analysis and Long-run Growth', Journal of 
Political Economy, 99(3): 500-521. 
Rodrik, D. (1999) The New Global Economy and Developing Countries: 
Making Openness Work. Washington, D.C.: Overseas Development Council. 
Understanding the ASEAN Development Gap 63 
Rodrik, D. (ed.) (2003) In Search of Prosperity: Analytic Narratives on Economic 
Growth. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Rodrik, D., Subramanian, A. and Trebbi, F. (2002) Institutions Rule: The Primacy 
of Institutions over Geography and Integration in Economic Development, 
NBER Working Paper No. 9305. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau for 
Economic Research. 
Romer, D. (1993) 'Do Students go to Class? Should They?', Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 7(3): 167-174 . 
.--(2001) Advanced Macoeconomics. New York: McGraw Hill. 
Romer, P.M. (1986) 'Increasing Returns and Long Run Growth', Journal of 
Political Economy, 94: 1002-1037. 
Sachs, ]. and Warner, A. (1995) Economic Reform and the Process of Global 
Integration, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 26(1): 1-118. 
Schultz, T. (1961) 'Investment in Human Capital', American Economic Review, 
51(1): 1-17. 
Seers, D. (1969) 'The Meaning of Development', International Development 
Review, 11(4): 3-4. 
-(1972) 'The Meaning of Development', in N. Baster (ed.), Measuring 
Development: The Role and Adequacy of Development Indicators. London: 
Frank Cass. 
Sen, A. (1980) 'Equality of What?', in S. McMurrin (ed.), Tanner Lectures on 
Human Values. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
-(1985) Commodities and Capabilities. Amsterdam: North Holland. 
-(1990) 'Development as Capability Expansion' in K. Griffin and J. Knight 
(eds), Human Development and International Development Strategy for the 
1990s. London: Macmillan. 
-(1993) 'The Quality of Life' in M.C. Nussbaum and A. Sen (eds), Capability 
and Well-being. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
-(1999) Development as Freedom. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 
Solow, R.M. (1957) 'Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function', 
Review of Economics and Statistics, 39: 312-320. 
Transparency International (2012) Corruption Perception Index 2011. Berlin: 
Transparency International. 
United Nations Development Program (UNDP) (1990) Human Development 
Report 1990. New York: Oxford University Press. 
-(1995) Human Development Report 1995. New York: Oxford University Press . 
.--(2010) Human Development Report 2010. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
-(2011) Human Development Report 2011. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
-(2012) Human Development Report: Indices and Data. Available at http:// 
hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/ (accessed 13 August 2012). 
WHO (2000) The World Health Report 2000. Health Systems: Improving 
Performance. Geneva: World Health Organization. 
-(2007) Everybody's Business: Strengthening Health Systems to Improve 
Health Outcomes. WHO's Framework for Action. Geneva: World Health 
Organization. 
World Bank (2006) Global Economic Prospects 2006: Economic Implications of 
Remittances and Migration. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. 
64 Mark McGillivray, Simon Feeny and Sasi Iamsiraroj 
---{2011a) Migration and Development Brief 17, Migration and Remittances 
Unit, Development Economics (DEC) and Poverty Reduction and Economic 
Management (PREM). Washington, D.C.: World Bank. 
---{2011b) World Development Indicators Online Database. Washington, D.C.: 
World Bank. 
---{2012) Open Data. Available at http://www.data.worldbank.org (accessed 15 
August 2012). 
Yanikkaya, H. {2003) 'Trade Openness and Economic Growth: A Cross-country 
Empirical Investigation', Journal of Development Economics, 72: 57-89. 
Zhuang, J., Gunatilake, H., Niimi, Y., Khan, M.E., Jiang, Y., Hasan, R., Khor, N., 
Lagman-Martin, A., Bracey, P. and Huang, B. (2009) Financial Sector 
Development, Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction: A Literature 
Review, ADB Economics Working Paper No. 173. Manila: Asian Development 
Bank. 
